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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S'TATE OF UTAH 
H. C. HARGRAVES, Building Inspector 
for S.ALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
HARRY L. YOUNG, KENNETH L. 
ANDER.SON, and WILLIAM W ALKEN-
HORST, 
Defendants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
'S'TATEMENT OF· F ACT·S 
Case No. 8275 
This appeal is from an order of the Third District 
Court sustaining a motion of the defendants for summary 
judgment. The action raises a question as to the inter-
pretation and validity of certain zoning ordinances of 
Salt Lake City. 
The defendants in this action are all residents of Salt 
Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Each of 
the three defendants, at a different location in Salt Lake 
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City, has constructed ana n1aintains what is commonly 
known as a fixed patio cover or carport without be'ing 
issued a permit hy the proper authorities of Salt Lake 
City. The defendants applied to the Board of Adjust-
ment of Salt Lake City for a variance in the zoning 
ordinances to permit them to maintain the fixed patio 
covers or carports. Defendants also proposed an ordi-
nance, the effect o:f which was to amend the zoning ordi-
nances to permit the type of structures involved herein. 
The Commission failed and refused to adopt the pro-
posed ordinance and the Board of Adjustment, under 
date of May 24,. 1954, denied the request of defendants 
for a variance. 
Under date· of July 13, 1954, the Board of Commis-
sioners of Salt Lake City ordered steps taken to effect 
the removal of the fixed patio covers or carports. De-
fendants advised the City Commission that they intended 
to retain the structures and asked that steps be taken 
immediately to obtain a ruling from thB courts as to the 
application and validity of the zoning ordinances as they 
relate to these structures. ·Thereafter, under date of Aug-
ust 23, 1954, a complaint was filed on behalf of the City 
praying for an order of the court directing these de-
fendants to remove the fixed patio cOivers or carports 
from their p·resent locations within 30 days. 
At the argument of this matter before the Third 
Judicial District ·Court, counsel 'for defendants advised 
the court that William Walkenhorst, one of the defend-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
ants named herein, had purchased additional property 
adjoining his premises so that under the City's view of 
the case, such defendant would not now be in violation 
of the city zoning ordinances and by stipulation of coun-
sel for plaintiff and defendants the action was dismissed 
as to William Walkenhorst. After argument, but without 
taking testimony, as requested by counsel for plaintiff, 
the Third Judicial District Court under date of Septem-
ber 20, 1954, granted the motion of defendants for sum-
mary judgment. This appeal is taken to this court from 
that ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
A. .THIS IS. NO·T A PROPER CASE F'OR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
(1) Fails to conform to the requirements of Rule 
56 (h). 
(2) F'ails to conform to the require·ments of Rule 
56 (c). 
B. DEF'ENDANTS SHOULD HAVE. PUR.S.UED 
REMED·Y PROVIDED BY 10-9-15, UTAH CODE 
ANNOT'ATED 1953. 
C. THE Z:ONING REGULATIONS IN QUE·STION. 
(1) Exclude the type of structures involved in this 
action . 
. ( 2) Are a proper exercise of the police power. 
A. THIS IS NOT A PR,OPER CA;SE F'OR SUMMARY 
JUD~GMENT BECAUSE 
( 1) Fails to conform to the requirements of Rule 
56 (b). 
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Rule 56 ('b) provides : 
"A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, 
or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judg-
ment is sought, may, at any time, move with or 
without sup·porting affidavits 'for a summary 
judgment in his favor as to all or any part there-
of." 
As we can see from the wording of the section, sum-
mary judgment is limited to situations where the action 
is brought against a party against whom a "claim, coun-
terclaim or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judg-
ment is sought." It hardly seems to require argument or 
citation of authority to show that the defending parties in 
this case do not fall within any of the classifications set 
out in the rule. Obviously, a counterclaim or cross-claim 
is not being asserted against defendants. Likewise, too, a 
declaratory judgment is not being sought. We have been 
unable to find any case which has held that the word 
''claim" in the rule, which is the only remaining portion 
of the rule which defendants could come under, has been 
held to include the type of action brought by plaintiffs 
in the District Court. 
A. THIS IS NO·T A PROPER CA·SE FOR SUMMARY 
JtJDGMEN·T BECAUSE 
·(2) Fails to conform to the requirements of Rule 
56 (c). 
Rule 56 (c) p-rovides : 
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"The motion shall be served a.t least 10 days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse 
party prior to the day of hearing may serve op-
posing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions 
and admissions on file, together with the affi-
davits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, 
may be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount 
of damages." 
As will be noted the rule provides that summary 
judgment should not be granted if there is an issue as to 
any material fact. In the immediate case the issue might 
well resolve itself as to whether or not there is any rea-
sonable relationship between the prohibiting .of such 
structures in side yards and the public health, safety, 
morals or general welfare of the inhabitants of Salt L'ake 
City. Now who is going to provide information that will 
help us to decide this point. All of us can sit in our re-
spective offices and form our own conclusions in this 
matter based upon limited, or no experience with the sub-
ject matter. It seems apparent that persons who have 
made a very thorough and an analytical study of the rela-
tionship between density in population, fire hazards, the 
health of the population, the efficient movement of 
traffic, and other matters directly affecting our every 
day health and welfare would be the appropriate parties 
to advise us on this subject. Certainly, experts from the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
Fire Department, the Health Department, Traffic De-
partment, Zoning Department, and perhaps others, who 
have studied the effect of the zoning ordinances on the 
health and welfare of the population should be brought 
into the picture to show the results of their studies. 
Otherwise, we are left up· to our own individual opinions 
without the benefit of information showing why particu-
lar zoning ordinances were adopted and why perhaps a 
side yard of 6 feet was required rather than a side yard 
of 4 or 8 feet. To most of us., with little reflection on the 
subject, we would fail to see why a zoning ordinance 
should provide for a maximum of 12 story buildings 
rather than 10 or 14 story buildings and it might be hard 
for us to see why the zoning ordinance would prohibit 
two families of two each in one dwelling but would not 
prohibit one family of ten members in the same dwelling. 
Likewise, it might not be readily ap·parent to us why one 
lawn umbrella would he permissible whereas a fixed or 
structural carport or patio eover would he p·rohibited. 
The anslwers to these questions are found in comprehen-
·sive studies which have been made in numerous cities 
showing the relationship· ·between cause and effect in 
such matters and showin·g also the tendencies which have 
been found to develop if apparently innocuous steps are 
p·ermitted to be taken in the first place . 
.As was stated by this court in the case of State ex 
rel. Civello v. New· Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440, 22 
.A.L.R. 2'60, which dealt with zoning ordinances: 
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"It is not necessary, for the validity of the 
ordinances in question, that w·e should deem the 
ordinances justified by considerations of public 
health, safety, comfort, or the general welfare. It 
is sufficient that the m.unicipal council could rea-
sonably have ha:d such considerations in mind. If 
such considerations could have justified the ordi-
nances, we must a:ssume that they did justify 
them." (Italics added.) 
How can we know what considerations might have 
influenced the adoption of zoning plans without further 
information on the subject~ 
The case of People v. Leighton, 44 N.Y.S. 2d 779, 
deals with the very question of the necessity for evidence 
in such cases. In the Leighton case defendant was con-
victed of violating city zoning ordinance. At the trial de-
fendant attempted to introduce evidence in the matter 
to prove that the ordinance, in its application to defend-
ant's premises, was an improper exercise of the police 
power. Such evidence was excluded by the trial court 
and testimony was limited to the question as to whether 
ordinance had been validly adopted and whether defend-
ant had constructed two family house. 
The court in deciding that the proffered testimony 
should have been admitted stated. "T'he burden of proof 
to show the unreasonableness of a municipal ordinance 
rests upon the person asserting it. However, the defend-
ant here was unable to meet such burden by the reason 
of the exclusion of any and all evidence offered on the 
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subject. This court, therefore, has no evidence before it 
upon which it can pass in determining the validity of the 
ordinance in its application to defendant's pre~mises. 
Whether the defendant on a· new trial can meet the 
burden of establishing the unreasonableness of the ordi-
nance remains to he seen. She is at least entitled to pre-
sent her proof on the subject." 
B. D·EF'E:NDANTS SHOULD HA·VE PUR.SUED 
REMED·Y PROVIDED BY 10-9-115, UTAH C·OD·E 
ANNOT'ATED 1953. 
Section 10-9-15·, Utah Code Annotated 1953, pro-
vides.: 
"JUDICIAL REVIEW O·F BOARD-'S. DECI-
'SION_:TTME~ LIMIT.ATION.- The city or any 
p·erson aggrieved by any decision of the board of 
adjustment may have and maintain a plenary ac-
tion for relief therefrom in any court of competent 
jurisdiction; provided, petition for such relief is 
p·resented to the court within thirty days after the 
filing of :such decision in the office of the board." 
Thus it seems ap·p·arent that defendants after their bout 
with the board of adjustment should have sought assist-
ance from any court of competent jurisdiction. Under an 
amendment which was made to 10-9-1'5 in 1949 such ap-
plication would have to be made to the court within 30 
days after the filing of th-e decision of the board of ad-
justment. 
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We think the Utah case of Provo City v. Claudin, 63 
Pac. 2d 570 is very pertinent to this point. In that case 
the City of Provo sought an injunction against defend-
ants to restrain them from operating a funeral home in 
violation of city ordinance. In the case it appeared that 
defendant, C. 0. Claudin, made an application to establish 
a funeral home, upon the pre·mises in question, to the 
board of adjustment in and for Provo City and that 
thereafter said Board denied the request of defendant 
Claudin. As to this point the court stated: 
"Doubtless the Claudins would not have been 
interested in protesting the classification at the 
time of the public hearings unless at that time 
they des'ired to establish a mortuary in the dis-
trict. But if later, when they were desirous of so 
doing and they conceived that the ordinance is in 
itself unfair in the manner specified, to wit, that 
the Class "B" District really includes territory 
which was at the time of the passage of the ordi-
nance commercial in character or since has become 
so, they should have called the attention of the city 
commission or zoning commission, whichever body 
is the one to whom an applicant should first apply, 
to the matter and obtained a ruling from such 
body, and then from that ruling, if adverse, have 
taken an appeal to the courts. Certainly the in-
correct procedure is to remodel the structure for 
a purpose prohibited in the zone by the ordinance, 
and then, as a defense to an injunction suit, hit 
the city with the plea of an unfair ordinance." 
If defendants in the immediate case, or in any other 
case, may fail to obtain a permit to build and thereafter 
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disregard the decision of the Board of Adjustment there 
is no purpose in 10-9-15. This ·section merely becon1es 
surplusage and of no consequence. 
C. THE .ZONING R.EGULATI·ONS IN QUESTION. 
(1) Excludes the type of structures involved in this 
action. 
The zoning regulations wh'ich apply to this problem 
state; Section 6725 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City, 1944: 
"In all Residential 'A' 'A-3' 'B-2' districts 
' ' ' ' for every building erected there shall be a side 
yard along each lot line. ;The least dimension of 
any such slide yard shall he 35 p·er cent of the 
building height, but in no case less than eight '(8) 
feet for Residential 'A' and A-3' * * *" 
' 
·Section 672:7, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 
1944: 
."'(a) The area of a side or rear yard shall 
be op-en and unobstructed, excep't for the ordin-
ary p·rojections of window sills, belt courses, cor-
nices and other ornamental features to the. extent 
of not more than four ( 4) inches except that where 
the building is not more than two ('2) stories in 
height the cornice or eaves may p·roject not more 
than two (2') feet into such yard * * *" 
"·(b} An o~pen iron fire escap,e may p·roject 
not more than four (4) feet into a side or rear 
yard." 
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Thus, in reading the two sections quoted, it seems 
apparent that a side yard of at least 8 feet is required 
in this district and, further, that such side yard shall be 
"open and unobstructed," with exceptions noted therein 
which do not concern us in this case. It would appear 
that the words "open and unobstructed" particularly 
when understood in connection with zoning ordinances 
and building codes not only in Utah, but throughout the 
country, mean just that. In the very section with which 
we are dealing, we note that exceptions are made for the 
eaves, chimney, etc., and in other sections of the code 
there are numerous references to fences, shrubbery and 
other obstructions of all kinds and descriptions. There-
fore, we reach the conclusion that if there were to be 
exceptions, in addition to those set out in Section 6727, 
the ordinances would have made provisions for the same. 
Section 426 of the Uniform Building C:ode, which has 
been adopted by Salt Lake City, defines a yard to be 
"an open, unoccupied spaee, other than a court, unob-
structed from the ground to the sky except where speci-
fically provided by this code on a lot on which the build-
ing is situated.'' 
Section 404 of the same code defines a court to be 
"an open unoccupied space bounded on two or more sides 
'by the walls of a building." Thus, by definition contained 
in the Uniform Building Code we are forced to the con-
clusion that a yard is an open unoccupied space unob-
structed from the ground to the sky on the lot on which 
the building is situated. Therefore, the only conclusion 
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""e can reach is that the ordinance, in talking of an open 
and unobstructed side yard, means that it shall be open, 
unobstructed and unoccupied except for enumerated ex-
ceptions in the ordinances. Any other construction of 
the ordinance would leave it up to the whiln, desire and 
caprice of each property owner to decide just what little 
bit of obstruction they should put up without being in 
violation of the ordinance. We respectfully suggest the 
only exceptions are included in the ordinance'S and if a 
variance is not given, the property owner is not to go 
beyond these exceptions. The only remedy is to obtain 
a variance, if it is justified. A variance was requested 
in this case and after thorough consideration denied. 
C. THE ZONING REGULATIONS IN QUES!TION. 
:(2) Are a proper exercise of the police power. 
Comprehensive zoning laws and ordinances have re-
peatedly been upheld since the landmark case of Euclid 
v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365. That case and sub-
stant'ially all of the ca~ses since that time on ~the question 
have stood squarely for the proposition that comprehen-
sive zoning laws and ordinances prescribing, among 
other things, the height of buildings to be erected and the 
extent of the area to be left op~en for light and air and 
in aid of fire protection, etc., are, in their general scope, 
valid under the F'ederal Constitution. 
The Supreme Court of the United States while ren-
dering its decision in the case of Gorieb v. Fox, 71 L. ed. 
605, went on to say: 
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"It is hard to see any controlling difference 
between regulations which require the lot owner 
to leave open areas at the sides and rear of his 
house and limit the extent of his use of the space 
above His lot and a regulation which requires him 
to set his building a reasonable distance back from 
the street. Each inte-rferes in the same way, if not 
to the same extent, with the owner's general right 
of dominion over his property. All rest for their 
justification upon the same reasons which have 
arisen in recent times as a result of the great in-
crease and concentration of population in urban 
communities and the vast changes in the extent 
and complexity of the problems in modern city 
life. Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., supra, p. 386. 
State legislatures and ·city councils, who deal with 
the situation from a practical standpoint, are 
better qualified than the courts to determine the 
neces~sity character and degree of regulation which 
these new and perplexing conditions require; and 
their conclusions should not be disturbed by the 
courts unless clearly arbitrary and unreasonable." 
The State Legislature of Utah granted considerable 
authority to cit'ies to promulgate and adopt zoning regu-
lations. 10-9-1, Utah Code Annotated, 19'53, provides: , 
"For the purpose of_ promoting health, 
safety, morals and the general welfare of the 
community the legislative body of cities and towns 
is empowered to regulate and restrict the height, 
number of stories and size of buildings and other 
structures, the percentage of lot that may be occu-
pied, the size of yards, courts and other open 
spaces, the density of population and the location 
and use of buildings, structures and land for 
trade, industry, residence or other purposes." 
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10-9-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides : 
"For any or all of said p·urposes the legisla-
tive body may divide the municipality into dis-
tricts of such number, shap·e and area as may be 
deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of 
tni~s article, and within such districts it may regu-
late and restrict the erection, construction, re-
construction, alteration, repair or use of buildings 
or structures, or the use of land. All such regu-
lations shall be uniform for each class or kind of 
buildings throughout each district, but the regula-
tion in one district may differ from those in other 
districts." 
10 .. 9-3, Ut:ah Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
'''Such regulations shall be made in accord-
ance with a comprehensive plan designed to lessen 
congestion in the streets, to secure safety from 
fire, panic and other dangers, to promote health 
and the general welfare to provide adequate light 
and air, to prevent the overcrow4ing of land, to 
avdid undue ·concentration of population, to facili-
tate adequate provision for transportation, wate1·, 
sewage, 'Schools, parks and other p·ublic require-
ments. Such regulations shall he made with rea-
sonable consideration, among other things, to 
the character of the district and its p~eculiar suit-
ability for particular uses, and with a view to 
conserving the value of buildings and encouraging 
the most ap·propriate use of land throughout the 
city." 
All of these sections sh.ow a legislative intent to give the 
city plenary power in regard to zoning. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
10-9-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
"Whenever the regulations made under au-
thority of this article require a greater width or 
size of yards, courts or other open spaces, or re-
quire a lower height of buildings or less number 
of stories, or require greater percentage of lot 
to be left unoccupied, or impose other higher 
standards than are required in any other statute 
or local ordinance or regulation, the provisions of 
the regulations made under authority of this 
article shall govern. Wherever the provisions of 
any other statute or local ordinance or regulation 
require a greater width or size of yards, courts 
or other open spHces, or require a lower height 
of building or a less number of stories, or require 
a greater percentage of lot to be left unoccupied, 
or impose other higher standards than are requir-
ed by the regulations made under authority of 
this article, the provisions of such statute, or local 
ordinance or regulation shall govern." 
This section likewise indicates a legislative intent 
to leave a maximum of open and unoccupied space. This 
section specifically states that if there is any 'S'tatute 
or local ordinance which imposes less restrictive stand-
ards that are imposed by the regulations made pursuant 
to the authority of this article, the regulations shall gov-
ern. This validity to obtain even in the face of a contra-
dictory statute enacted by the Legislature of the State 
of Utah. 
In the case of Potts v. Boar'd of Adjustment (N.J.) 
1945, 43 A. 2d 850, p~laintiff challenged action of Board 
of Adjustment in denying h'is ap~plication for leave. to 
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convert his single family dwelling into a two fa1nily 
apartment house within the present structure and frame-
work of the dwelling. The ordinance restricted the area 
in question and did not permit two family dwellings. 
The houses were rather close together in the area and 
there were very limited side yards. Plaintiff alleged that 
Board action was arbitrary, unreasonable and discri-
minatory; contrary to the intent and purpose of the 
zoning act, and that the Board had previously granted 
p·ermission for two family dwellings in same district. 
The court upheld decision of Board and stated: 
· "The inquiry is whether the board has con-
formed to the legislative formula; and when 
there has been a valid and reasonable exercise of 
the delegated power, there is no occasion for judi-
cial interference. The legislative authority has 
confided the determination of the question of vari-
ances and special exceptions to the sp·ecialized 
judgment of the zoning hoard; and this court may 
intervene only when the general regulation or 
the action taken by the subordinate agency is arbi-
trary, cap~ricious or unreasonable. It may not 
substitute its judgment for that of the zoning 
board." 
Boar:d1n(Jjyt v. Davis) et al.J (City of Marshalltown, 
Intervenor), 3 N. W. 2d 608: 
"The Municipal Zoning La,v, Chapter 324, 
Code of 19·39, empowers cities and towns to adopt 
compre.hensive zoning ordinances. The constitu-
tionality of such statutes and ordinances enacted 
thereunder have been generally sustained as a 
' 
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valid exercise of the police power, in the interest 
of public peace, order, morals, health, safety, corn-
fort, convenience and the general welfare . 
. "The authorities recognize that a zoning ordi-
nance, which rests upon the police power of the 
state ma_y, and often does, lay an uncompensated 
'burden upon some property ovvners. However, 
such requirements do not constitute an easement 
upon the property. Nor do they deprive the owner 
of his property as in the case of an appropriation 
by eminent domain for some specific public use. 
They are merely a restraint upon the owner's 
use of the property for the protection of the gen-
eral well-being or in other words to prevent harm 
to the public. In determining the validity of the 
police regulation the prime consideration must be 
the general purpose and relationship of the ordi-
nance and not th·e hardship of an individual case. 
"In general, the authorities above cited enun-
ciate the doctrine that set-hack provisions of an 
ordinance will not be held invalid unless they 
clearly appear to be arbitrary and unreasonable. 
Although there are some contrary holdings this 
is the doctrine of the majority of the more re-
cent cases. It appears to be sound and to be con-
sistent with the position taken by this court in 
Anderson v. Jester, supra, and in Des Moines v. 
Manhattan Oil ·Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 183 N.W. 832, 
188 N.W. 92'1, 23 A.L.R. 1322." 
Oliva v. City of Garfield, 62 A. 2d 677: 
"One attacking a zoning ordinance as unrea-
sonable in its application is met with the· presump-
tion that it is reasonable and must hear the burden 
of establishing the contrary. Repp v. Shahadi, 
Sup. 1944, 132 N.J.L. 2'4, 38 A. 2d 284; Yoemans 
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v. Hillsborough Tp·. Sup. Ct. 1947, 135 N.J.L. 599, 
54 A. 2d 202; Crow v. Town of Westfield, supra. 
We find from the record b·efore us that the plain-
tiff has not met this burden and that the amenda-
tory ordinance does not violate the constitutional 
guaranties upon which she relies." 
There have been a number of Utah cases recently on 
the subject of zoning including the Phi Kappa case and 
the Dowse case. 
Phi KapVJ?a Iota Fraterity v. Salt Lake City, 212 
P. 2d 177. 
In this cas'e the zoning authority of Salt Lake City 
was challenged in regard to the zoning limitation placed 
on dormitories, fraternities or sorority houses. The 
court points out that 10-9-1, and following, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, grant the governing body of the city 
the discretionary power to district and zone cities for 
various purposes that are to the public interest and the 
exercise of that power will not be interfered with unless 
th·e discretion is abused. The court goes on to say: 
"·There are, of course, various solutions for 
zoning p~roblems such as this ; and opinions may 
differ as to which is the more efficacious. But it 
is not for the court to weigh the respective merits 
of these solutions. That is the duty that lies upon 
th·e shoulders of the governing body which is by 
statute authorized to district and zone cities. The 
selection of one method of solving the p~roblem in 
p·re.ference to another is entirely within the dis-
cretion of the commission ; and does not, in and 
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of itself, evidence an abuse of discretion. If 
changes' have developed which indicate that a dis-
persal of fraternities and sororities will better 
solve the ~problem, that is a matter for submission 
to the commission; and not one for the courts.'' 
Dowse .v. Salt Lake City Corp., 255 P. 2d 723: 
Plaintiff alleged that his land was unsuitable for 
residential property; that it was located in a potential 
industrial or commercial zone; that the zoning ordinance, 
as applied to his property, serves no beneficial use and in 
no manner promotes the health, safety, morals or general 
welfare of the community; that the value of his property 
would he greatly enhanced if it could be used for indus-
trial purposes; and that under these circumstances the 
zoning ordinance is so opp-ressive as to be confiscatory 
and unlawful. The court sustained the city's motion to 
dismiss the complaint on the ground it failed to state 
a cause of action. The court went on to say: 
''In this jurisdiction the discretionary power 
to district and zone cities for various purposes in-
cident to the public interest is' granted to the gov-
erning body of the city by statute, section 
10-9-1, 2, 3, U.C.A. 1953. Palpably the exer-
cise of the zoning power is a legislative func-
tion and activity. Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust 
Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P. 2d 724, 726. The wisdom of 
the plan, the necessity, the number, nature and 
boundaries of the district are matters which lie in 
the discretion of the City authorities, and only 
if their action is confiscatory, discriminatory or 
arbitrary may the court set aside their action. 
Marshall v. Salt Lake ·City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P. 
2d 704, 149 A.L.R. 282. The fact that plaintiff's 
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one-half lot might be more p-rofitably us~ed for 
commercial than for residential purposes, or 
indeed the fact that it has become unsuited for reside~tial purposes does not show discrimina-
tion or reveal arbitrary action." 
In West Bros. Brick Co. v . .Alexan.dria, 169 \Ta. 271, 
192 s .. E. 881, the court said: 
"Zoning ordinances, in the main, deal not 
with p·resent conditions, but with conditions to 
come. ·They are not designed to Haussmanize a 
city, but to guide its future growth. Necessarily 
any plans of that nature must he in some degree 
arbitrary. It is seldom that there is any definite 
reason for holding that a lot on one side of a line 
should be devoted to one purpose and that just 
across it to another. The adaptability of certain 
terri to rial sections of cities to certain uses fade 
into each other. One end of a field may be, beyond 
preadventure, suited to industrial developments, 
the other to private homes. Intervening there 
must be a twilight zone. If the legislature cannot 
be relied upon to say where lines must run, who 
can be vested with that discretion~ Demonstrative 
accuracy is an imp·ossibility." 
This case sums up· the p·ractical aspects of any zon-
ing regulation. . 
We, of course, should note that we are not concerned 
with just one or even two buildings' which are the subject 
of this action. If only these two buildings. were involved 
it would be relatively inconsequential. However, the 
effect of the decision of the District Court is to p·ermit 
carports and patios, not only of the type involved in this 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
action, but of every other kind, type and description, to 
spring up on every lot in 'Salt Lake City. F'urthermore, 
such construction is not limited to one side but they might 
appear on either side, on both sides, on the front or on 
the back. If they may have a plastic roof presumably 
they could have a cement or a shingled roof. Thus, we 
see that in reaching a conclusion in the immediate case 
\Ve must bear in mind not so much the affect of these 
structures but the likely affect of all the structures which 
will immediately spring up all over the city if the decision 
of the District Court is sustained. It is my recollection 
that counsel for the defendants at the argument of the 
case before the District Court suggested that there are 
already hundreds of these structures springing up, and 
his concern with the ordinance was largely prompted 
by a desire on the part of a number of firms to immedi-
ately construct hundreds more. 
We might draw some analogy between the present 
restriction in the ordinance and a restrictive ordinance 
regulating or eliminating dogs under the city's police 
power. In any given case it might readily be possible 
for the defendant to come in and show that his dog was 
well cared for and well behaved. He might easily estab-
lish that the children in the neighborhood enjoyed play-
ing with the dog and as a result of its existence it con-
tributed to, rather than detracted from, the general 
health, safety and welfare in the vicinity. It would seem, 
however, that if the ordinance had, as its over-all purpose 
and effect, the control of not one dog but thousands 
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throughout the city and that the net effect of the over-all 
control was beneficial with respect to the health, safety, 
welfare and general well-being of all the citizens, the 
ordinance would be sustained under the police power. 
In the immediate case it might be noted, also, that de-
fendants have made no showing as the cases seem tore-
quire in order to overcome the presumption of validity. 
The need for vision of the future in the government 
of cities does not lessen with the years. To the extent 
the cities become more crowded, even grea;ter vision and 
planning are needed. Certainly a minor restraint in 
beneficial enjoyment should be approved in the general 
public interest when a wide spTead disregard of a minor 
restraint would result in a major building infiltration of 
side and hack yard space throughout the city. 
We respectfully submit the decision of the District 
C:ourt should be reversed. 
Attorneys for App~ellant 
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